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Components of nuclear power plants do not always have historical failure data to 
probabilistically evaluate their reliability characteristics. To overcome this 
drawback, an alternative approach has been proposed by involving experts to 
qualitatively justify basic event likelihood occurences. However, expert judgments 
always involve epistemic uncertainty and this uncertainty needs to be quantified. 
Existing fault tree analysis quantifies uncertainty using Monte Carlo simulation, 
which is based on probability distributions. Since expert judgments are not 
described in probability distributions, Monte Carlo simulation is not appropriate for 
evaluating epistemic uncertainty. Therefore, a new approach needs to be developed 
to overcome this limitation. This study proposes a fuzzy probability algorithm to 
evaluate epistemic uncertainties in fault tree analysis. In the proposed algorithm, 
fuzzy probabilities are used to represent epistemic uncertainties of basic events, 
intermediate events, and the top event. To propagate and quantify epistemic 
uncertainty in fault tree analysis, a fuzzy multiplication rule and a fuzzy 
complementation rule are applied to substitute the AND Boolean and OR Boolean 
gates, respectively. To see the feasibility and applicability of the proposed 
algorithm, a case-based experiment on uncertainty evaluation of the AP1000 long 
term cooling system to mitigate the large break loss of coolant accident is discussed. 
The result shows that the best estimate probability to describe the failure of AP1000 
long term cooling system generated by the proposed algorithmis 3.15×10-11, which 
is very closed to the reference value of 1.11×10-11. This result confirms that the 
proposed algorithm offers a good alternative approach to quantify uncertainties in 
probabilistic safety assessment by fault tree analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Westinghouse AP1000 is designed based 
on the previous generation of the Westinghouse 
AP600 by significantly increasing the power 
generation from 600 MWe to 1000 MWe.                     
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(US-NRC) and the European Utility Requirement 
have certified the AP1000 as a generation III+ 
nuclear power plant [1,2]. The AP1000 design is the 
first commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) design 
which implements passive safety systems [3]. Those 
                                                 

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passive safety systems function based on gravity, 
convection, condensation, and heat circulation [4-6]. 
Through the implementation of those passive safety 
systems, high reliability, human error minimization, 
simplification and easy modularization can be 
achieved [5,7]. However, passive safety systems 
may still fail due to the possibility of a false 
response to the physical phenomenon which it is 
based on. Therefore, the reliability of AP1000 
passive safety system still needs to be evaluated. 
 The loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is 
defined as an accident in which coolant is freely 
discharge from the reactor primary system. 
Meanwhile, a large break LOCA is a design                 
basis accident for pressurized water reactors 
Atom Indonesia Vol. 41 No. 3  (2015) 113 - 121 
 
 
 Atom Indonesia 
 
Journal homepage: http://aij.batan.go.id 
 
 
 
 
113 
 J.H. Purba / Atom Indonesia Vol. 41 No. 3  (2015)  113 - 121 
(PWRs)  [7,8]. The AP1000 design provides three 
passive safety systems to mitigate the large break 
LOCA, i.e. injection system by accumulator (AI), 
low pressure injection system (LPI) which                      
injects water from in-containment refuelling                 
water storage tank (IRWST), and long                          
term cooling system (LTCS) which injects                   
water from passive containment cooling                      
water storage tank (PCCWST) [9]. A number of 
valves, which will be automatically actuated                           
to their safeguard positions when they                              
lose power or receive an actuation                             
signal, are aligned to those three passive                    
safety systems. 
 Since the AP1000 is still under construction 
[6,10,11], historical failure data is still unavailable 
to statistically estimate basic event probabilities. 
Hence, the reliability of the AP1000 passive                   
safety systems has to be studied by a fault tree 
analysis (FTA) using generic data [9,12-14]. 
Unfortunately, due to the use of those generic data, 
analysis results will not confirm the real 
performance of the AP1000 passive safety systems. 
 To overcome this limitation, Purba and                   
Sony Tjahyani [15] have utilized experts to 
qualitatively justify basic event reliability 
characteristics of the AP1000 safety systems.                   
Due to imperfect knowledge or incomplete 
information, epistemic uncertainties are always 
involved in experts judgements [16]. Zhou                      
et al. [14] acknowledged that uncertainties in                          
FTA need to be evaluated to achieve more                    
reliable results. 
 Conventional FTA evaluates uncertainties 
using Monte Carlo Simulation. However,                
since Monte Carlo simulation is based on 
probability distribution, this technique is not 
appropriate for evaluating epistemic uncertainties 
raised in expert judgments, which do not                      
come with probability distributions [17,18].                        
The motivation of this study is how to                          
evaluate epistemic uncertainties in reliability                    
study of the AP1000 passive safety systems                         
due to the involvement of experts in the basic                   
event reliability evaluations. Therefore, a fuzzy 
probability algorithm is developed by introducing 
fuzzy probabilities and fuzzy combination                       
rules into fault tree analysis. Two aspects of 
originalities of this study are (1) an introduction of                           
fuzzy probabilities into fault tree                                  
analysis to describe the occurrence likelihoods                   
of basic events, intermediate events and                              
the top event; and (2) a substitution of                        
Boolean algebra by fuzzy combination                              
rules to quantify fault trees. This study is                          
the further development of our previous                   
studies in [15,19]. 
 
 
THEORY 
Expert elicitation 
 
Expert elicitation can be defined as a 
structured process to formalize and quantify an 
uncertain quantity due to the limitations in the data 
or when such data is unattainable because of 
physical constraints or lack of resources [20,21]. 
This elicitation technique consists of three parts,                 
i.e. experts whose expertises are related to                           
the field being studied, justification on the event 
occurrence likelihoods, and analysts who will                
use the expert judgements. The expert elicitation 
process may integrate empirical data with scientific 
judgment and identify a range of possible 
likelihoods. 
To properly characterize various factors                 
that contribute to the overall uncertainty  in the 
expert judgments, expert elicitation should be                   
done in a panel but every individual expert in                   
the panel should be elicited separately using                    
a standardized protocol. Hence, the most                          
robust picture of uncertainties can be achieved.                   
To minimize a very wide spectrum of                             
responses, experts to be elicited should be                      
properly selected. Cooke et al. [22] recommended 
three indicators to select the most capable                    
experts, i.e. number of scientific publications, 
recommendations from a wide range of experts,                   
and experiences with previous similar                           
studies. By scoring each criteria and summing                
up the total score, the experts whose expertise                 
are more relevant to the study what it is intended for 
will be properly selected. 
Unfortunately, in real-world applications,                 
the experts may have different levels of expertise, 
backgrounds, and working experiences.                     
Moreover, different scientific intuition and                    
ability to integrate information with theories                    
can also play critical roles in expert judgments. 
Therefore, experts could  have different judgments 
on a same event. To accommodate these                   
different judgments, it is important to aggregate 
those judgments into a single value to find a 
consensus. 
Combining expert judgments requires                    
relative weights of individual experts to each                    
other. Different justification weights from 0                      
to 1 may be assigned to every expert to                      
represent their credentials, credibility, or 
competency. An expert with a weight                                  
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of 1 is the most credible, while an expert                          
with a lower weight is deemed to be                                       
less credible. 
Cooke and Goossens [23] have formulated 
two key performance-based indicators, i.e. 
calibration and informativeness, to weight selected 
experts. For calibration process, ‘seed variables’ 
need to be provided in advance. Seed variables are 
variables whose values have been already known to 
the safety analysts but  at the time of assessment the 
experts do not know those values. Using several 
calibration questions, the probabilities of experts to 
correctly answer the questions can be drawn  and 
weight can be properly given to each expert.                    
It is also important to note that the seed variables 
and the calibration questions must be as close as 
possible to the problems that the study is intended  
to solve [24]. 
 
 
CALCULATION METHODS 
 
Fuzzy probability algorithm 
 
A fuzzy probability algorithm is proposed in 
this study to evaluate epistemic uncertainty of the 
AP1000 long term cooling system to mitigate large 
break LOCA. The algorithm introduces fuzzy 
probabilities and fuzzy combination rules into fault 
tree analysis. A fuzzy probability is a membership 
function  of fuzzy numbers used to describe the 
occurrence likelihood of an event. In this proposed 
fuzzy probability algorithm, fuzzy probabilities are 
represented by triangular fuzzy numbers  and used 
to describe the likelihood of the occurences of basic 
events, intermediate events, and the top event. To 
quantify the system fault tree, two fuzzy 
combination rules, i.e. a fuzzy multiplication rule 
and a fuzzy complementation rule, are introduced.                           
A fuzzy multiplication rule quantifies the output            
of an AND Boolean gate, while a fuzzy 
complementation rule quantifies the output of an 
OR Boolean gate. The probability of the top event is 
then generated from  the calculated top event fuzzy 
probability using a logarithmic function. The 
proposed fuzzy probability algorithm consists of 
three main steps. Each step is explained in                        
details below. 
 
Step 1: Generating basic event fuzzy probabilities 
 
The objective of this step is to generate best 
estimate, lower bound, and upper bound fuzzy 
probabilities of basic events. To realize this 
objective, we have developed  a set of seven failure 
possibilities to qualitatively describe the occurrence 
likelihoods of basic events related to the operation 
of nuclear power plants [25]. This set and its 
corresponding fuzzy probabilities are shown                
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Failure possibilities and corresponding fuzzy 
probabilities [25] 
 
Failure possibilities Fuzzy probabilities 
Very Low (VL)    0.00, 0.04, 0.08VL x   
Low (L)    0.07, 0.13, 0.19L x   
Reasonably Low (RL)    0.17, 0.27, 0.37RL x   
Moderate (M)    0.35, 0.50, 0.65M x   
Reasonably High (RH)    0.63, 0.73, 0.83RH x   
High (H)    0.81, 0.87, 0.93H x   
Very High (VH)    0.92, 0.96,1 .00VH x   
 
In this step, experts, who have been selected 
and properly weighted using the elicitation 
technique described in the previous section, 
individually charaterize a failure possibility of a 
basic event by responding to, for example, : 
What is the failure possibility of basic event e? 
Is it very low, low, reasonably low, moderate, 
reasonably high, high, or very high? 
Using Table 1, the n failure possibilities given 
by n experts to a basic event e are then converted 
into their n corresponding fuzzy probabilities. 
Finally, the best estimate, lower bound, and upper 
bound fuzzy probabilities of  basic event e are 
calculated as follows: 
 
Step 1.1: Best estimate fuzzy probability calculation 
 
The best estimate fuzzy probability of basic 
event e, which is represented by superscript                     
 ̅, is calculated by aggregating those n fuzzy 
probabilities into one fuzzy probability                
using (1). 
 
   
 ̅( )  ∑ (      ( ))
  
        (1) 
 
where wj is the weight of the j
th
 expert,    ( )          
is the i
th 
fuzzy probability in Table 1 given              
by the j
th
 expert to basic event e, 7 is the number of 
fuzzy probabilities in Table 1, and n is the number 
of experts in the panel. wj and    ( ) in (1)         
must meet properties defined in (2) and (3), 
respectively. 
 
          ∑   
 
       (2) 
 
    ( )  {
   ( )   ( )    ( )   ( ) 
   ( )   ( )    ( )
} (3)  
 
115 
 J.H. Purba / Atom Indonesia Vol. 41 No. 3  (2015)  113 - 121 
Step 1.2: Lower bound fuzzy probability calculation 
 
The lower bound fuzzy probability of               
basic event e is generated using the lowest                   
fuzzy probability from the n fuzzy probabilities 
assigned to basic event e as defined in (4). 
 
   
 ( )     {   ( )}       
   
 (4) 
 
Step 1.3: Upper bound fuzzy probability calculation 
 
The upper bound fuzzy probability of                
basic event e is generated using the highest                    
fuzzy probability from the n fuzzy probabilities 
assigned to basic event e as defined in (5). 
 
   
 ( )     {   ( )}       
   
 (5) 
  
If a fault tree of the safety system being 
evaluated has m basic events, then the m best 
estimate fuzzy probabilities, the m lower                     
bound fuzzy probabilities, and the m upper bound 
fuzzy probabilities will then be generated                          
in this step. 
 
Step 2: Propagating fuzzy probabilities from basic 
events to the top event 
 
The objective of this step is to quantify each 
subtree from leave nodes to the top event.                        
A subtree is a simple fault tree which consists of 
two or more inputs (e1, e2, e3, …,en), one output (e0) 
and one Boolean gate (an OR gate or an            
AND gate). 
The output of an OR Boolean gate and                   
an AND Boolean gate of a subtree can be quantified 
using a fuzzy complementation rule and                     
a fuzzy multiplication rule, respectively, as shown 
in (6-7). 
 
 
    ( )    ∏ {     ( )}
 
    (6) 
 
    ( )  ∏    ( )
 
    (7) 
 
 
where n is the number of input events.  
 
 In this step, equations (6-7) are repeatedly 
used to quantify sub trees from basic                           
events throughout the system fault tree until                        
the best estimate, lower bound and upper                   
bound fuzzy probabilities of the top event,                                   
i.e.,   
 ̅( ),    
 ( ), and    
 ( ), are obtained. 
Step 3: Converting the top event fuzzy probability 
into a probability 
 
The objective of this step is to generate the 
best estimate, lower bound and upper bound 
probabilities to describe the failure of the top event, 
i.e.   
 ̅,   
  and   
  from its corresponding fuzzy 
probabilities   
 ̅( ),    
 ( ) and    
 ( ), which have 
been generated in Step 2, using (8) [25]. 
 
    {
 
  
([
    
  
]
 
 ⁄
      )
     
      
 (8) 
 
where RS is the reliability score of the top event.  
An area defuzzification technique has been 
specifically developed for NPP safety assessment by 
using fuzzy fault tree analysis to decode a fuzzy 
probability into a reliability score [26]. The RS of 
fuzzy probability  ( )  (        ) can be 
calculated using (9). 
 
  
 
  
(         ) (9) 
 
where x1, x2 and x3 are, respectively, the left support, 
the core, and the right support of the membership 
function representing a fuzzy probability. 
 
 
Problem description 
 
A large break LOCA is defined as a pipe 
rupture of a total cross-sectional area of equal to or 
greater than 0.09 m
2
 of the reactor primary cooling 
system. In the AP1000, the three passive safety 
systems to mitigate the large break LOCA are an 
injection system by accumulator (AI), a low 
pressure injection system (LPIS) and a long term 
cooling system (LTCS) as shown by the event tree 
in Fig. 1 [9]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The event tree to mitigate the AP1000 large                     
break LOCA.  
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Figure 1 shows that a large break LOCA in 
the AP1000 can be successfuly mitigated if                   
the LTCS functions properly as expected.                         
To successfully perform its function, the LTCS 
involves a residual heat removal system 
recirculation (RHRSR) and a long term cooling 
passive system (LTCPS). Meanwhile, the success of 
the LTCPS depends on the success of the low 
pressure passive injection line (LPPI) and the 
containment cooling passive system (CCPS) [9]. 
The schematic diagram  of the LTCS is shown in 
Fig. 2. Meanwhile, the schematic diagram of CCPS 
is given in Fig. 3. Due to the complexity of the 
LTCS fault tree, this fault tree is presented in Fig. 4 
and Fig. 5. Since there are actually two lines in the 
LTCS but Fig. 2 only shows one line, Vkl in Fig. 4 
and Fig. 5 means the valve Vl of  the line k. 
Therefore, V16 in Fig. 4 is the valve V6 in Fig. 2 of 
the first line. Similarly, V26  in Fig. 4 is the valve V6 
in Fig. 2 for the second line. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The schematic diagram of the LTCS. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The schematic diagram of the CCPS.  
 
 
Fig. 4. The LTCS fault tree. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The LTCPS fault tree. 
 
The epistemic uncertainty of the LTCS to 
mitigate the AP1000 large break LOCA is then 
evaluated using the proposed fuzzy probability 
algorithm described in the previous Section. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section mathematically illustrates the 
quantification process of the proposed fuzzy 
probability algorithm and discusses the results to 
confirm its feasibility and applicability to the 
evaluation of uncertainty in fault tree analysis. 
 
Step 1: Generating basic event fuzzy probabilities 
 
From the LTCS fault tree given in Figure 4, it 
can be seen that there are 26 basic events which 
need to be evaluated by experts by describing their 
failure possibilities using the set of seven failure 
possibilities given in Table 1. For simplification 
purposes, let us assume that seven experts with the 
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same level of expertise have been selected using the 
elicitation technique described in the previous 
section as denoted below. 
 
  {   
 
 
            } 
 
This number of experts has been properly 
implemeted in nuclear power plant safety 
assessment involving experts [15,19]. Those                   
seven selected experts are then asked to 
qualitatively characterize the occurrence likelihoods 
of those 26 basic events. For example,                             
those seven experts have characterized the 
occurrence likelihoods of basic event RHRS1 as 
Moderate, High, Reasonably High, High, High, 
High, Reasonably High. Therefore, the set of fuzzy 
probabilities describing the likelihood occurences of 
basic event RHRS1 can be denoted as follows: 
 
       ( )  
*  ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )+ 
 
The occurrence likelihoods of other basic 
events are given in Table 2 and their corresponding 
fuzzy probabilities are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Failure possibilities of the LTCS fault tree evaluated 
by experts 
 
Basic 
events 
Failure possibilities subjectively justified by expert 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 
V11 RL RL RL RL RL RL RL 
V12 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V13 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V14 RL M M RL RL RL M 
V15 RL M M RL RL RL M 
V16 RL RL M RL RL M RL 
V17 M M M RL M RL M 
V18 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V19 M M M RL M RL M 
V21 RL RL RL RL RL RL RL 
V22 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V23 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V24 RL M M RL RL RL M 
V25 RL M M RL RL RL M 
V26 RL RL M RL RL M RL 
V27 M M M RL M RL M 
V28 RL M RL RL RL RL RL 
V29 M M M RL M RL M 
RHRS1 M H RH H H H RH 
RHRS2 M H RH H H H RH 
MOV1 RL RL RL RL RL RL RL 
MOV2 RL RL RL RL RL RL RL 
MOV3 RL RL RL RL RL RL RL 
AOV1 M RL M RL M RL M 
AOV2 M RL M RL M RL M 
AOV3 M RL M RL M RL M 
 
Table 3. The set of basic event fuzzy probabilities 
 
Basic 
events 
   Set of fuzzy probabilities 
V11     ( )  *   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V12     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V13     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V14     ( )  *   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V15     ( )  *   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V16     ( )  *   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )+ 
V17     ( )  *  ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V18     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V19     ( )  *  ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V21     ( )  *   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V22     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V23     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V24     ( )  *   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V25     ( )  *   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V26     ( )  *   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )+ 
V27     ( )  *  ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
V28     ( )  *   ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
V29     ( )  *  ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
RHRS1       ( )  *  ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )+ 
RHRS2       ( )  *  ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )   ( )   ( )    ( )+ 
MOV1      ( )  *   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
MOV2      ( )  *   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
MOV3      ( )  *   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )+ 
AOV1      ( )  *  ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
AOV2      ( )  *  ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
AOV3      ( )  *  ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )    ( )   ( )+ 
 
Step 1.1: Best estimate fuzzy probability calculation 
 
Using (1), the best estimate fuzzy probability 
of basic event RHRS1 is calculated as follows: 
 
      
 ̅ ( )  
 
 
 (  ( )    ( )     ( )  
  ( )  ( )    ( )     ( ))  
(              ). 
 
Using the same procedure, the best estimate 
fuzzy probabilities for other basic events can be 
generated and the results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Step 1.2: Lower bound fuzzy probability calculation 
 
Using (4), the lower bound fuzzy probability 
of basic event RHRS1 is then generated as folows: 
 
       
 ( )     {       
( )}
   
 
   ( )  
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Using the same procedure, the lower bound 
fuzzy probabilities for other basic events can be 
generated and the results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Basic event lower bound, best estimate and upper 
bound fuzzy probabilities 
 
Basic 
events 
  Lower bound fuzzy 
  probability 
   Best estimate fuzzy 
   probability 
  Upper bound fuzzy  
   probability 
V11     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V12     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V13     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V14     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V15     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V16     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V17     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V18     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V19     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V21     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V22     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V23     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V24     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V25     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V26     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V27     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V28     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
V29     
 ( )  (              )     
 ̅ ( )  (              )     
 ( )  (              ) 
RHRS1       
 ( )  (              )       
 ̅ ( )  (              )       
 ( )  (              ) 
RHRS2       
 ( )  (              )       
 ̅ ( )  (              )       
 ( )  (              ) 
MOV1      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
MOV2      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
MOV3      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
AOV1      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
AOV2      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
AOV3      
 ( )  (              )      
 ̅ ( )  (              )      
 ( )  (              ) 
 
Step 1.3:Upper bound fuzzy probability calculation 
 
Using (5), the upper bound fuzzy probability 
of basic event RHRS1 is generated as follows: 
 
       
 ( )     {       
( )}
   
 
   ( )  
 
Using the same procedure, the upper bound 
fuzzy probabilities for other basic events can be 
generated and the results are presented in Table 4 
The final results of this step are 26 best 
estimate fuzzy probabilities, 26 lower bound fuzzy 
probabilities and 26 upper bound fuzzy probabilities 
as shown in Table 4. Those values represent the 
occurrence likelihoods of the 26 basic event of the 
LTCS fault tree presented in Fig. 4.  
Step 2: Propagating fuzzy probabilities from basic 
events to the top event. 
 
This step is to illustrate how the output                  
of the OR gate and the AND gate are to be 
quantified. For this purpose, the fuzzy probabilities 
of the intermediate event RecL11 fail in Fig. 4 and 
the intermediate event IL1 fail in Fig. 5 are 
calculated. Each intermediate event will have                  
a best estimate fuzzy probability, a lower bound 
fuzzy probability, and an upper bound fuzzy 
probability. 
Using (6), the best estimate fuzzy probability 
of intermediate event RecL11 fail is calculated as 
follows: 
 
 RecL11 fail = V16 + V17 
            
 ̅ ( )    {(      
 ̅ ( ))  
(      
 ̅ ( ))}  (                    ). 
 
Using the same procedure and applying the lower 
bound and upper bound fuzzy probabilities of basic 
events V16 and V17, the lower bound and the upper 
bound fuzzy probabilities of intermediate event 
RecL11 fail can be generated. The lower bound and 
the upper bound fuzzy probabilities of the RecL11 
fail are            
 ( )  (                    ) 
and             
 ( )  (                    )   
respectively. 
 
Meanwhile, using (7), the best estimate fuzzy 
probability of intermediate event IL1 fail is 
calculated as follows: 
 
 IL1 fail = L11 fail x L12 fail 
          
 ̅ ( )          
 ̅ ( )          
 ̅ ( )  
(                    ). 
 
Using the same procedure and applying the lower 
bound and upper bound fuzzy probabilities of 
intermediate events L11fail and L12 fail, the lower 
bound fuzzy probability and the upper bound fuzzy 
probability of intermediate event IL1 fail can be 
generated and those fuzzy probabilities are found           
to be          
 ( )  (                    ) and 
         
 ( )  (                    ), 
respectively. 
By using (6) and (7) repeatedly to quantify 
the output of each Boolean gate in the LTCS fault 
tree, the best estimate, the lower bound, and the 
upper bound fuzzy probabilities of the other 
intermediate events, including the top event             
of the LTCS fault tree, can be generated as shown    
in Table 5.
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Table 5. Intermediate and top event fuzzy probabilities 
 
Events 
   Lower bound fuzzy      
   probability 
  Best estimate fuzzy 
   probability 
   Upper bound fuzzy  
    probability 
L11 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
L12 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
IL1  fail          
 ( )  (                   )          
 ̅ ( )  (                    )          
 ( )  (                    ) 
ILS1 fail           
 ( )  (                    )           
 ̅ ( )  (                    )           
 ( )  (                    ) 
L21 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
L22 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
IL2  fail          
 ( )  (                   )          
 ̅ ( )  (                    )          
 ( )  (                    ) 
ILS2 fail           
 ( )  (                    )           
 ̅ ( )  (                    )           
 ( )  (                    ) 
LPPI fail           
 ( )  (                    )           
 ̅ ( )  (                    )           
 ( )  (                    ) 
CCPSL1 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
CCPSL2 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
CCPSL3 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
CCPS fail           
 ( )  (                    )           
 ̅ ( )  (                    )           
 ( )  (                    ) 
LTCPS fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
RecL11 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
RecL12 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
Rec1 fail          
 ( )  (                    )          
 ̅ ( )  (                    )          
 ( )  (                    ) 
RecL21 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
RecL22 fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
Rec2 fail          
 ( )  (                    )          
 ̅ ( )  (                    )          
 ( )  (                    ) 
RHRSR Line 1 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
RHRSR Line 2 fail         
 ( )  (                    )         
 ̅ ( )  (                    )         
 ( )  (                    ) 
RHRSR fail            
 ( )  (                    )            
 ̅ ( )  (                    )            
 ( )  (                    ) 
LTCS fail           
 ( )  (                    )           
 ̅ ( )  (                    )           
 ( )  (                    ) 
 
 
Step 3: Converting the top event fuzzy probability 
into a probability. 
 
From Table 5, it can be seen that the best 
estimate, the lower bound, and the upper bound 
fuzzy probabilities of the top event, which               
is the failure of the LTCS, are           
 ̅ ( )  
(                          ),           
 ( )  
(                         ) and 
          
 ( )  (                          ), 
respectively. Using (9), the RS of the top event fuzzy 
probability for the best estimate, lower bound and 
upper bound values are 0.010409, 0.003102 and 
0.027792, respectively. Finally the best estimate, 
lower bound and upper bound probabilities to 
describe the failure of the top event can be 
generated using (8). Those three top event 
probabilities are   
 ̅         -  ,   
       
  -   and   
         - . These values confirm 
that the best estimate probability to describe the 
failure of the LTCS to mitigate the AP1000 large 
break LOCA is 3.15×10
-11
 with the range of 
uncertainties is between 1.73×10
-16
 and 2.98×10
-8
. 
Meanwhile, Guimaraes et al. [9] calculated the best 
estimate failure probability of the LTCS to mitigate 
the AP1000 large break LOCA is 1.11×10
-11
 with 
the range of uncertainties between 2.21×10
-14
 and 
5.81×10
-9
. 
From those two results, it can be seen that the 
best estimate probability generated by the proposed 
fuzzy probability algorithm is very closed to the 
corresponding probability generated by Guimaraes 
et al. [9]. However, the uncertainty range generated 
by the proposed fuzzy probability algorithm                        
is a bit wider than the one calculated by Guimaraes 
et al. [9]. This is because those two approaches 
apply different sources of basic event reliability 
data. Guimaraes et al. [9] assume that basic                    
events have a point median value and                                    
an error factor, which are not always available.               
On the other hand, the proposed fuzzy                             
probability algorithm assume basic events                          
do not have probability distributions and rely                     
on the expert judgments. However, to avoid                      
wider uncertainty, experts involved to characterize 
basic event reliability have to be properly                                  
selected. In addition, uncertainty calculations                     
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by the proposed fuzzy probability algorithm is 
simpler than the one proposed by Guimaraes                     
et al. [9]. The proposed fuzzy probability          
algorithm applies two simple fuzzy combination 
rules. Meanwhile, Guimaraes et al. [9] applies               
the α-cut method,  which is more complicated                   
than fuzzy combination rules. 
Nevertheless, the results of the case study 
have confirmed that the proposed fuzzy probability 
algorithm can propagate epistemic uncertainties 
from basic events to the top event and quantify     
fault trees. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study presented in this article proposed  a 
fuzzy probability algorithm to quantify                     
epistemic uncertainty of the long term cooling 
system to mitigate the AP1000 large break LOCA 
when basic events do not have probability 
distributions. The best estimate failure probability of 
the AP1000 LTCS which is generated by the 
algorithm is 3.15×10
-11
, which is very close to the 
reference value of 1.11×10
-11
. Meanwhile, the 
uncertainty range of the fault tree generated by the 
proposed algorithm is between 1.16×10
-15
 and 
1.52×10
-8
, which is a bit wider compared to the 
reference values, which are between 2.21×10
-14
 and 
5.81×10
-9
. These results confirm that the proposed 
fuzzy probability algorithm is feasible for 
application in quantifying uncertainties in 
probabilistic safety assessment by fault tree 
analysis. Therefore, the proposed fuzzy probability 
algorithm is feasible for application in evaluating 
uncertainties in fault tree analysis when basic events 
do not have corresponding reliability data and 
experts are involved to evaluate the reliability 
characteristics of those basic events. 
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